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Summary — Studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer rights. 
Rights to determine how to use the land are regularly ignored. However, user rights are often 
limited. Relying on a unique Vietnamese panel data set at both household and plot level, we show 
that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent crop diversification. Restrictions do not 
decrease household income, but restricted households work harder, and there are indications that 
they are supplied with higher quality inputs. Our findings are consistent with the view that it is 
possible to intervene effectively in agricultural production to promote output and food security. 
Nevertheless, potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern must be carefully considered in a 
period where global food markets are in turmoil. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global economy is passing through a period of profound challenges, and the “triple crisis” 
of finance, food and climate change (Addison et al. 2010) has motivated the development 
profession to start re-examining existing development strategies and policies and their effectiveness 
in achieving broad-based progress. The food dimension of the triple crisis, including the dramatic 
food price fluctuations during the period 2007-09 triggered a wide variety of responses by national 
governments and international institutions. They vividly brought home the need for reforms in the 
international food system and the critical role of effective food policies and institutional 
arrangements at global, regional, national and local levels. The institutional setting involves a wide 
array of issues, including the role of the state, the market and the private sector in economic 
development; but the way in which property rights and land use arrangements are structured and 
managed are widely accepted as being of the utmost importance.  
There is a large and well-established literature on the effects of land rights in economic 
development and transformation.1 However, analytical studies have so far focused on tenure 
security and transfer rights, such as the right to sell, rent, mortgage, and bequeath land, rather than 
rights concerning use (e.g. Feder and Onchan 1987; Place and Hazell 1993; Besley 1995; Hayes et 
al. 1997; Braselle et al. 2002; Goldstein and Udry 2008). One reason for this is that use rights are 
often implied by transfer rights. For example, Braselle et al. (2004) study a region in Burkina Faso 
and report that 91.2 per cent of farmers surveyed have a permanent right to choose what to grow on 
their plots, while only about 25 per cent have the right to rent or give away the plot. Sales are never 
allowed, and it is virtually never the case that a farmer has the right to transfer a plot, but not the 
right to choose what to grow.  
On the other hand, in for example Vietnam and other transition economies the situation is very 
different. Brandt et al. (2002) report that in 25 per cent of the villages they surveyed in rural China, 
villagers cannot freely determine what to grow. In addition, 80 to 90 per cent of all plots are held as 
“responsibility land”. This implies that households are obliged to deliver set quotas of grain or other 
specified crops to the commune. Hence, farmers are forced to grow these crops on at least some of 
their land. In Myanmar, the government formally applies non-binding or “indicative” planning, but 
Kurosaki (2008) finds that in practice local authorities often put significant pressure on farmers to 
produce according to official plans. Most commonly, farmers are coerced into growing rice. 
Another illustration is that in the Central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, governments impose severe crop choice restrictions on farmers, mainly to facilitate the 
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production of cotton (International Crisis Group 2005; Trevisani 2007; Halimova 2007). In sum, 
while the global crisis has drawn attention to the critical importance of institutional arrangements in 
the food sector, and while the right to choose which crops to grow would appear to be an important 
aspect of farmer property rights to land, no up-to-date empirical evidence is available.  
We therefore pursue this topic, making use of an unusually rich rural household data set from 
Vietnam with plot level information.2 Our results suggest that restrictions are indeed binding in an 
economic sense. If they were lifted, many farmers would shift to other crops. A simple argument 
from microeconomic theory suggests that binding crop choice restrictions should decrease either 
household income, leisure or both. We test these hypotheses and find that restrictions do indeed 
have a significant effect on household labor supply, but no effect on income from cultivation. We 
also find some evidence that restricted households are supplied with higher quality inputs than other 
households. A final result is that land titles have significant effects on crop choice and household 
labor supply in line with existing literature.  
Overall we conclude that while it is indeed possible to intervene reasonably effectively in crop 
choices as evidenced by the Vietnamese case, this does come at a cost. Such costs should be 
carefully considered, especially when policy choices are made in the context of continued turmoil in 
food markets. Arguably, this finding is relevant across a range of different countries where 
governments intervene into crop choice decisions, including for example Vietnam, China, 
Myanmar, and countries in Central Asia.  
Section 2 provides further background and discusses the nature of restrictions on crop choice in 
Vietnam. In Section 3 a simple microeconomic model of the effect of crop choice restrictions is 
formulated, and Section 4 presents data and descriptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 investigate the 
effects of restrictions on crop choice and labor supply, while Section 7 brings out the impact on 
agricultural income. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF STATE INTERVENTION IN LAND USE 
MANAGEMENT 
Twenty four years after the introduction of the Doi Moi reform process, market institutions are 
firmly established in rural Vietnam.3 Households sell their production output to private buyers, trade 
land and sell labor on the private market. At the same time the state (including national, provincial, 
district, and commune authorities) retains a hugely important role in economic life. The state 
intervenes actively in the land market, supplies many inputs in agricultural production, strongly 
 4 
dominates formal markets for financial services, and plays a key role in a large number of local 
organizational activities. More specifically, authorities intervene heavily in farmers’ choice of 
crops, and while the land law gives households the right to sell, rent, exchange, mortgage, and 
bequeath their land, many farmers do not have the right to decide how to use their plots. In our 
sample, around 50 per cent of plots have restricted crop choice, although at the same time around 74 
per cent of plots owned and operated by households are held with a title, a so-called Land Use 
Certificate (LUC).4 
A range of insightful studies have analyzed the effects of the Vietnamese move towards 
privatization of agricultural land management (Do and Iyer 2008; Deininger and Jin 2008; Pingali 
and Xuan 1992; Ravallion and van de Walle 2004, 2005, 2006). Yet, these studies have focused 
squarely on tenure security and transfer rights with no attention to the importance of user rights. 
This may in part be due to the fact that econometric analysis of the effects of crop choice 
restrictions faces difficult identification challenges. The most important crop choice restriction in 
Vietnam is to compel farmers to grow rice. This is done to achieve production quotas so as to 
secure food supplies and meet export targets. It follows that authorities have strong incentives to 
impose restrictions on the most productive land and most productive households. This means that 
crop choice restrictions are likely to be correlated with unobserved land and household 
characteristics, which are, in turn, correlated with crop choice and land productivity. To deal 
convincingly with these problems is not easy. However, we are fortunate in having panel data at 
both household and plot level. 
By way of background, we also note that the important Resolution No.10 in 1988 and the 1993 
Land Law nominally granted farmers the right to decide what to grow. As the land law was 
implemented, however, it was hotly debated whether farmers in rice growing areas should be 
allowed to shift to other crops; and the 1998 and 2001 revisions to the land law clarify that changes 
in land use purpose are only allowed “within the existing physical planning framework adopted by 
central and local governments” (Vasavakul 2006, p. 226). The formal justification for state 
intervention is now found in the 2003 Land Law (for example article 11, §1 and article 36). 
Restrictions are administered by commune authorities, according to the commune land use plan. 
The plan is produced by commune authorities, subject to approval at district level. Formally, 
households can apply for a change in land use purpose at the district level but in practice it is very 
difficult for farmers to change or remove restrictions on their plots.5 At each administrative level, 
land use plans must be consistent with plans at higher levels (from the commune to the district, the 
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province and national plan). Hence, flexibility is limited.  
Table 1 presents administrative, national level data on the extent of land use restrictions in 
different regions of Vietnam. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The table shows that farmers are obliged to grow rice on 35 per cent of the total land area used 
for crop agriculture. Restrictions are concentrated in the two deltas of the Mekong and Red River. 
Since land in the deltas is considerably more productive than in the uplands and population 
densities are much higher, the importance of restrictions in terms of the number of farmers affected 
is much higher than 35 per cent.  
Why does the state impose restrictions on land use? In a sense, it is not surprising that the 
government of Vietnam makes use of centralized planning. Still, we may ask why an administration 
which has liberalized in many other fields has chosen to maintain restrictions on land use. 
Originally, the overriding concern was food security. In the early 1980s, Vietnam experienced 
severe food shortages, and these events continued to affect agricultural policies after the initiation 
of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986. Food security remains a major motive behind restrictions, but 
export targets are playing an increasing role. For example, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment’s Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan (SDP) (p. 64) states that Vietnam should 
export 3 to 4 million tons of food crop products per year over the period 2006-10. One method for 
reaching this goal has been to restrict farmers to growing rice, the most important food export.  
The fact that one of the reasons for imposing restrictions is to meet certain production targets 
means that the government (national and local) has an incentive to impose restrictions on the 
highest quality land, and the most effective producers, in order to maximize the probability that 
targets are met. Other reasons for restricting land use mentioned by Vietnamese officials include 
“the fact that local violations [of land use restrictions] may environmentally damage the areas 
developed for rice growing; that in some areas farmers are not equipped to grow anything other than 
rice; and that the state has already invested heavily in irrigating rice land” (Vasavakul 2006, p. 227). 
Finally, anecdotal evidence exists on disputes over land use between farmers and authorities. In 
the south, conflicts have occurred because farmers were prevented from converting rice fields into 
shrimp raising farms. In the Red River delta, conflicts are reported to have taken place because 
farmers were not allowed to grow fruit trees instead of rice (Vasavakul 2006, p. 227). Violations of 
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land use restrictions may result in severe sanctions. For example, the Hanoi People’s Committee in 
2002 confiscated 50 hectares of “illegally used” land (Marsh and Macauley 2006). 
Formally, crop choice restrictions are as already noted mainly motivated by concerns about food 
security and export targets. Nevertheless, it may be asked whether government-imposed restrictions 
are in fact merely a response to demands from local communities. The rice production process is 
characterized by important communal elements, mainly due to the need to manage irrigation 
facilities, and the production decisions of one farmer may therefore be of considerable interest to 
other farmers in the area. If government restrictions were lifted, perhaps similar restrictions would 
be imposed by informal community institutions? While there may be merit in this line of thinking, 
several factors lead us to believe that the restrictions imposed by authorities do in fact go well 
beyond what farmers would themselves prefer. 
First, if restrictions are necessary to solve local, collective action problems, then it is surprising 
that this reason is not mentioned in the accounts of official motivations for imposing restrictions 
(described above). Doing so would seem to be a straightforward way to strengthen the legitimacy of 
restrictions. 
Second, restrictions typically force farmers to grow one particular crop, rice. If the main 
motivation for restrictions were to keep irrigation systems functioning, a softer system of 
restrictions would be sufficient. For example, it might be necessary to prohibit cropping patterns 
that prevent irrigation water from running through a field to reach the neighbors field, but this 
would generally be consistent with allowing several different crops other than rice.  
Third, results presented below show that farmers subject to restrictions tend to use higher 
quality inputs in crop agriculture than other farmers. This is consistent with the view that 
restrictions are a means to ensure high levels of production, and that restricted farmers are therefore 
subsidized by the government. The correlation is more difficult to understand if the real purpose of 
restrictions is to solve community level coordination problems. 
Fourth, the regional variation in the incidence of restrictions does not track the importance of 
communal irrigation systems very closely. For example, one can try to focus on the two main, rice 
growing areas in Vietnam, the Red River and Mekong River deltas. While communal, canal-based 
irrigation systems are overwhelmingly dominant in the Red River Delta (RRD), private pumps are 
much more prevalent in the Mekong River Delta (MRD) (Barket et al. 2004, pp. 25-26). If the real 
motivation behind restrictions were the need to manage shared irrigation systems, we would expect 
restrictions to be much more common in the RRD than in the MRD. In fact, Table 1 shows that 
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restrictions are only slightly more prevalent in the RRD (75 percent) than in the MRD, where more 
than two thirds of the land for crop agriculture (68 percent) is also subject to restrictions.  
Fifth, the different social traditions of northern and southern Vietnam also suggest that 
restrictions should be much more common in the North than in the South, if they did in fact 
originate with local communities. During colonial times, northern and central Vietnam was 
dominated by so-called “corporate” villages. These were villages with high barriers to migration 
and with high levels of internal social control. In contrast, southern Vietnam (“Cochinchina” in the 
colonial terminology) was characterized by “open” villages, with low barriers to migration, and 
relatively low levels of social control (Popkin 1979, e.g. pp. 173-174). Pierre Gourou documented 
that more than a fifth of the cultivated area in the Red River delta was communally owned and that 
each village had detailed, written sets of rules governing many aspects of village life.6 Such 
institutions were generally much less important in the south of the country (Gourou 1936/1965, pp. 
268-272, 365; Gourou 1940, pp. 229, 276). Hence, the historical precedent for community 
intervention into household activities is stronger in the North than in the South. The fact that 
restrictions are almost as common in the MRD as in the RRD does not fit well with the view that 
restrictions originate with local communities. In contrast, since rice productivity is very high in the 
MRD, it fits very well with the view that restrictions are, as the government says, a means to ensure 
high, aggregate levels of rice production. 
 
3. THEORY 
We now go on to sketch a simple microeconomic model to illustrate how restrictions on crop 
choice may affect household behavior. Consider a farm household who maximizes the following 
utility function: 
U C X   (1) 
 
where C is consumption, and X leisure. Assume that the household commands time resources 
normalized to 1 and operates an agricultural land area of size Q . The household grows two 
different crops, denoted 1 and 2. The prices received by the household for the crops are denoted p1 
and p2, respectively. The income of the household is given by: 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )I p f L Q p f L Q   (2) 
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where f1 and f2 are the production functions for crop 1 and crop 2, respectively, and L denotes labor 
input. Assume that both production functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Also, assume that 
consumption simply equals income. Exploiting the fact that X = 1 – L1 – L2, the household then 
maximizes: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2( , ) ( , ) 1U p f L Q p f L Q Q L L     
   
(3) 
 
Denote the solution to this problem by ( * * *1 2 1, ,L L Q ), and assume that the government imposes the 
restriction that the household must grow crop 1 on an area equal to at least 1
rQ . If 1
rQ  is higher than 
the desired area for crop 1, *1Q , we say that the restriction is binding. The effect of imposing a 
binding restriction can be illustrated in a diagram such as Figure 1.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
The figure shows income as a function of leisure (or equivalently, of labor supply). The schedule 
PP is the income function in the case without restrictions, and the schedule PPr is the income 
function after a binding restriction has been imposed.7 U and Ur are simple, linear indifference 
curves.  
The optimal solution for the household is point A before the restriction is imposed, and point B 
after. The restriction in this case increases both labor supply and income. For other parameter 
values, income might drop as a result of restrictions. The only outcome which is entirely ruled out is 
a simultaneous increase in both leisure and income. This argument motivates our analysis of the 
impact of crop choice restrictions on income and labor supply in Sections 6 and 7.  
 
4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
We make use of a unique household and plot level panel data set collected in the Vietnam 
Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). The surveys were implemented in 12 provinces 
in Vietnam between July and September 2006 and July and September 2008. It reinterviewed 
households sampled for the income and expenditure modules of the 2002 and 2004 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) in the 12 provinces.8 Provinces were selected to 
facilitate the use of the survey as an evaluation tool for Danida supported programs in Vietnam. 
Seven of the 12 provinces are covered by the Danida business sector support program (BSPS), and 
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five provinces are covered by the agricultural and rural development (ARD) program. The 
provinces supported by the agricultural support program are located in the North West and Central 
Highlands, so these relatively poor and sparsely populated regions are over-sampled. Our sample is 
statistically representative at the provincial but not at the national level.  
The 2006 round of the VARHS survey covered 2,324 households in 466 communes. Out of 
these households, 2,271 were identified and resurveyed in 2008 (implying an attrition rate of seven 
percent). We analyze the 2,049 of these households, who operate a farm, grow crops, and have data 
on key variables. The household survey collected detailed plot-level information on property rights 
(including restrictions on use), land use, irrigation, mode and time of acquisition, and other plot 
characteristics. It also provides detailed information at the household level on agricultural inputs, 
outputs and investment in addition to general information about individuals and households. 
While household-level panel data has become relatively common, it is unusual that economic 
surveys collect panel data at the plot level. In the 2006 round of the survey, enumerators sketched a 
“map of plots” for each household. It indicates the approximate location of each household plot in 
relation to the family home, and also includes information on the size of the plot, the distance from 
the family home, and the code assigned to the plot, according to the coding system detailed in the 
questionnaire and enumerators’ manual. These maps were stored, and copies were taken back to 
households in 2008 and used to identify plots. A total of 12,511 plots were included in the 2006 
survey for the households who were reinterviewed in 2008, and 9,432 of these plots were identified 
again in 2008. Households stated that they parted with a total of 861 plots, and if plots had been 
split up, or merged with other plots, they were regarded as “new” plots. Some 1,865 plots were 
classified to have changed in these two ways. An additional 353 plots (three per cent of the original 
sample) were not re-surveyed for a variety of reasons.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the plots and households analyzed. The first line shows 
that restrictions on crop choice are common, and a drop occurred between 2006 and 2008. This 
stems partly from the general trend towards increased influence of market forces, and partly from 
the fact that high rice prices in 2008 rendered restrictions less necessary in some areas, in the sense 
that the high prices meant that rice became a more attractive crop. Next, the table documents that by 
far the most common restriction is that farmers must grow rice. The table also shows that most plots 
are titled and that the share of plots titled remained stable between 2006 and 2008. The share of 
plots planted with rice has decreased slightly, while the share irrigated and the share which is rented 
is the same in the two survey years.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
At the household level, household size and the share of household heads that are female are 
unchanged, while household heads, not surprisingly, are older in 2006 than in 2008. The household 
head’s average years of schooling is slightly higher in 2008 than in 2006, reflecting both additional 
schooling received by some heads and the changed identity of the household head in some 
households. Real income from crop agriculture increased very substantially. This is mostly a 
reflection of the very large increases in world market prices of crops over the period. Farm sizes 
decrease moderately over the period, reflecting continuous subdivision of farms, as parents hand 
over land to their children. Household labor supply increased marginally, especially in crop 
agriculture, in line with increased monetary returns. The table also shows the expected, sharp 
increase in the real price of rice received by farmers. 
 
5. CROP CHOICE 
In our econometric analysis, we first investigate whether restrictions do in fact impose binding 
constraints on farmers. Would they grow something else if they were not subject to restrictions? 
Most restrictions compel farmers to grow rice, but obviously many would plant rice even in the 
absence of restrictions. Natural conditions in most areas of Vietnam are very well suited to rice 
cultivation. On the other hand, anecdotal evidence suggests that the shift from growing rice to fruits, 
vegetables, flowers or other crops may in many cases by quite profitable, even in the delta areas 
(Vietnam News 2005, 2006, 2008) If restrictions are binding in an economic sense, there should be 
a significant, partial correlation between restriction status and the decision to grow rice, even when 
household and plot characteristics, and developments in prices, are controlled for.  
We proceed by assuming that the determination of crop choice can be described by the 
following model: 
 
'pht pht pht h ph phtC R x u v e        , (4) 
 
where phtC  is crop choice on plot p in household h in year t. The variable takes the value one if the 
plot is planted with rice in at least one season in year t, and zero otherwise. phtR  is a dummy 
indicating whether there is a restriction on the plot specifying that rice must be grown; phtx  is a 
vector of potentially time-varying variables that may affect crop choice, such as property rights, 
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access to irrigation, and prices; 
hu  is an unobserved, household specific effect and phv
 
is an 
unobserved, plot-specific effect; and phte  is an idiosyncratic, time varying error term, which is 
assumed to be independent across different communes, but potentially auto-correlated within 
communes. Conditional on the unobserved, fixed effects, phte  is assumed to be uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, while α, β and γ are parameters to be estimated.  
In this model, the introduction of household fixed effects in a regression would remove the bias 
stemming from 
hu , but not the bias from phv . It is eminently plausible that unobserved plot 
characteristics, such as the quality and nature of the soil, play a significant role for the choice of 
crop. At the same time, these characteristics are correlated with the imposition of restrictions. 
Authorities have, as already alluded to, a significant incentive to choose restrictions so as to 
maximize rice production. Introducing fixed effects at the plot level removes the bias from 
unobserved plot characteristics which are fixed over time. Since this is likely to be correct for 
variables such as the type and quality of soil, the possibility to include plot fixed effects is a 
significant benefit. One potentially important factor not taken into account by fixed effects is the 
development of the price received by farmers for rice. Variations in prices may potentially affect 
both household decisions to grow rice, and the authorities’ decision to impose restrictions. We 
introduce controls for the price of rice, calculated as the commune average of prices received by 
farmers in the sample. Other crops are not sufficiently widely grown and traded to calculate prices 
for all the sampled areas. Another factor that needs to be controlled for is managerial quality (e.g. 
Mundlak 1961). The manager’s ability is to a large extent taken into account by the fixed effects, 
but the variable cannot be assumed to be entirely fixed over time. Farmers may receive additional 
training, and the identity of the household head may change. We therefore introduce the household 
head’s total years of schooling as an additional control variable, based on the hypothesis that more 
educated farmers may be more willing than others to experiment with other crops than rice.  
Results are shown in Table 3, and the first column shows a strong, and highly statistically 
significant, partial correlation between restrictions and crop choice. The probability of growing rice 
is predicted to increase by 14 percentage points when a restriction is imposed. Column two shows 
that this effect is only slightly lower (12 percentage points) when controls for potentially time-
varying factors are included. Column three shows the results from a regression without plot fixed 
effects (a “pooled” regression). The estimated effect of restrictions in this model is much higher 
than in the fixed effects models, underlining the importance of controlling for plot characteristics. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Unsurprisingly, the availability of irrigation has a strong positive effect on the probability of 
growing rice. This variable might be endogenous in the sense that the decision to invest in irrigation 
may follow the decision to grow rice, rather than the other way around. Note, however, that 
investment in irrigation facilities in Vietnam is generally undertaken by the authorities, rather than 
by households. We therefore believe it is reasonable to assume that the availability of irrigation is 
exogenous.  
The probability of growing rice increases when the household receives a title for a plot. This 
may appear to be at variance with Do and Iyer (2008) who found that land titles increase investment 
in perennial crops. Yet, the apparent contradiction disappears when it is recalled that initiating rice 
production also entails investment costs.9 Years of schooling has the expected negative sign but is 
completely insignificant in the fixed effects model. The price variable is not significant. 
In sum, changes in restriction status are very strongly correlated with changes in crop choice, 
even when observed and unobserved plot characteristics are controlled for. This indicates that 
formal restrictions do in fact affect household behavior. To some extent, it is also conceivable that 
causality runs in the other direction, from behavior to restrictions. To the extent feasible, authorities 
may impose restrictions where it “hurts the least”. That is, additional restrictions may be imposed 
first on farmers who planned to expand rice production in any case. However, since aggregate rice 
production targets are rigid, as described above, there is a clear limit to how far farmers’ wishes can 
be accommodated. Still, the possibility that restrictions may in some cases follow from a farmer’s 
desire to grow rice rather than the other way around, means that it is interesting to learn which 
subjective reasons farmers state for their choice of crops. Table 4 provides such evidence. In 
VARHS 2008, respondents were asked for each plot they had planted, why they had chosen the 
crop they grew in the most recent season.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results show that for 37 per cent of all plots, farmers state that the main reason for growing 
the crop is that they are “obliged by authorities”. Some 41 per cent say that the crop has high 
productivity or high efficiency, and 17 per cent say that the plot is not suitable for other crops. On 
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plots where an objective, formal crop choice restriction is present (column two), respondents on 80 
per cent of the plots say that the obligation toward the authorities is the most important reason for 
their choice of crop. This does not imply that farmers would shift to another crop if restrictions were 
lifted in 80 per cent of the cases, and subjective data of the type presented in Table 4 should always 
be interpreted with great care and some skepticism. Nevertheless, the fact that a large share of 
respondents answer that the obligation is the most important reason for their crop choice is 
consistent with the findings in Table 3 and does strengthen the interpretation that restrictions affect 
behavior, rather than the other way around. If restrictions were simply a nominal tag attached to 
plots where rice would be grown anyway, it is likely that farmers would have cited productivity or 
plot suitability as the main reasons for crop choice.10 In sum, the qualitative evidence presented in 
Section 2, the results from crop choice regressions and the answers to questions about subjective 
reasons for crop choice together present a consistent picture of a restrictions regime, which is 
widespread and has real effects on crop choice decisions. 
 
6. HOUSEHOLD LABOUR SUPPLY 
The simple microeconomic argument illustrated in Figure 1 suggests that if crop choice 
restrictions are binding, they are likely to have an effect on household income and labor supply. We 
therefore turn to an investigation hereof. Since data on labor input and income from crop agriculture 
are not available at the plot level, these analyses are conducted at the household level. 
We first consider labor supply. Table 5 presents the results of estimating household fixed effects 
regressions for household labor supply per working household member. The first two columns 
explain labor input in crop agriculture (including annual as well as perennial crops) and the last two 
total household labor supply (in logs). The measure of crop choice restrictions used is the share of 
agricultural land subject to a restriction. A year dummy is included in all regressions. In columns 
two and four, a number of other control variables are also included. First, the share of land with a 
red book is introduced. If land titles increase investment, they may also affect labor supply, 
depending on whether these investments are labor-saving or labor-using (see Do and Iyer 2008). 
The size of operated agricultural area (“farm size”) is also included, since land and labor are 
complementary inputs in agricultural production. Finally, total household size in logs, the price of 
rice and the household head’s years of schooling are included, and the first, second, fourth and fifth 
models account for household fixed effects. These play an important role by helping remove the 
effect of unobserved household preferences for leisure. Local authorities in Vietnam may be able to 
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observe at least some of these preferences, and since they have an incentive to impose restrictions 
on the most hard-working households, this strengthens our analysis. On the other hand, since most 
of the variation in labor supply is between rather than within households (reflected in low R-
squared values in the fixed effects models), we also include the pooled regression estimator, which 
exploits between as well as within household variation. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Results show a significant, positive effect of restrictions on labor supply, both for crop 
agriculture and for all activities. The estimated effect is similar in fixed effects- and pooled 
regressions. Such an effect appears plausible. Rice cultivation requires higher labor inputs per 
hectare than most other crops. For example, in 2008 households who grew only rice put in a total of 
717 days of labor per hectare per year in crop agriculture, whereas households growing no rice 
supplied 494 days per hectare per year. As we have seen, restrictions increase the probability of 
growing rice. 
It is somewhat surprising that the effect on labor input in agriculture is not significantly stronger 
than on total labor supply. One would expect the effect of restrictions to work mainly through crop 
agriculture. One possible explanation is that attenuation bias is stronger for labor input in crop 
agriculture than for total labor supply. First, total labor supply is likely to be measured with less 
error than labor supply in any particular sector (since errors for different sectors to some extent 
cancel out in the aggregate). Second, labor input in agriculture is particularly difficult to measure, 
inter alia because the number of hours worked per day often varies strongly over the year. 
The results also show that the share of land held with a title has an insignificant, negative effect 
on labor input in crop agriculture, but a positive effect on total labor supply. This is consistent with 
the results reported in Do and Iyer (2008), who found that land titles in Vietnam increase labor 
input in non-farm activities. Increases in total household size are estimated to decrease labor input 
per worker in crop agriculture. This indicates that total household labor input in agriculture does not 
increase proportionally with household size. As the household size increases, members share the 
workload in agriculture, and each works less. On the other hand, household size has no effect on 
total labor supply per worker. The rice price variable is not significant in the fixed effect 
regressions, but has a strong, positive effect in the pooled regression for labor supply in crop 
agriculture. Years of schooling is also insignificant in the fixed effects models, but has a significant, 
positive effect in the pooled regression for total labor supply. 
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In sum, crop choice restrictions increase labor input per worker, both in crop agriculture and on 
aggregate. This is consistent with the observation that rice cultivation requires relatively high labor 
inputs. 
7. INCOME FROM CROP AGRICULTURE 
We now turn to the econometric analysis of restrictions and household income from crop 
agriculture. Table 6 presents regressions for income from crop agriculture, in logs. Income is 
defined as the value of output minus the value of all purchased, variable inputs, and all inputs are 
assumed to be purchased, except for “self-provided fertilizers”. The measure of restrictions used is, 
again, the share of operated area with restrictions. The first three specifications include a household 
fixed effect and a year-dummy. The last column shows the results from a pooled regression. 
Column two includes land, household and commune characteristics that may plausibly vary over 
time. These are the share of land with a title, farm size, household labor input in crop agriculture, 
the share of irrigated land, the share of rented land, the price of rice and the household head’s years 
of schooling. In addition, column three introduces land characteristics which are, by and large, time-
invariant at the plot level. Since the household might acquire or part with land, however, these 
characteristics may in principle change at the household level, and these changes may be correlated 
with restrictions and with income. We include the share of land with slight, medium, and steep 
slope (leaving out the share with a flat slope as the residual category), and have an additional 
measure of land quality. This is the share of land that falls in each of four tax brackets.11 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Results show that restrictions have a statistically insignificant, positive effect on income from 
crop agriculture. Hence, restrictions do not seem to make households poorer, although, as illustrated 
in Figure 1, the increased labor efforts they induce might still mean that restrictions reduce welfare. 
The estimated coefficient on land titles is positive, but falls just short of being statistically 
significant (p = .13 in column 3). As already alluded to, land rights are often viewed as endogenous. 
However, since a major, potential source of endogeneity is unobserved household and land 
characteristics, this is much less of a concern in household fixed effects models than in cross-
section analyses. As we would expect from Table 2, there is a large positive year effect. In column 
1, income from crop agriculture is more than 30 per cent higher in 2008 than in 2006. However, 
when the price variable is introduced (along with other variables) in columns 2 and 3, the year 
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effect drops significantly, and the price of rice enters with a large positive coefficient. This is 
consistent with the view that the year effect mainly operates through the increase in output prices. 
Farm size and labor input have the expected signs and are highly significant. The share of land 
irrigated does not have a significant effect on income. This might indicate that Vietnamese 
irrigation systems are ineffective, but it is more likely a result of the fact that this variable does not 
vary much over time. Education is positive and weakly significant in the second regression, 
insignificant in the third regression and significant at the one per cent level in the pooled regression 
four. 
Estimated coefficients on the slope and land class variables are all insignificantly different from 
zero. We take this as an indication that the household fixed effects do a good job of controlling for 
land characteristics. 
The fact that the restrictions variable remains positive even after controls for labor input have 
been introduced (in columns 2 and 3) is not what one would have expected from Figure 1. It implies 
that for a given level of labor supply, restrictions should lead to a decrease in income. One might 
argue that since the estimated coefficients on restrictions are not significantly different from zero, 
the theoretical prediction and our findings are reconcilable; but the fact that the coefficient is 
positive does suggest that it is relevant to dig further into the full story behind the data. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the absent, negative effect of restrictions on 
income. First, restrictions may be beneficial if they solve coordination problems. As discussed in 
Section 2, most villages depend critically on a well-functioning irrigation network. If some crops 
disrupt the irrigation system, for example because water is prevented from running through a field, 
then it may make sense to ban them. Even though it was argued in Section 2 that this line of 
reasoning is probably not the main motivation behind the restrictions, restrictions may still 
sometimes have the effect of solving such problems. Cross-pollination between different varieties of 
crops could also present collective action problems. If restrictions do solve such problems, it 
implies that they have positive externalities. If they do, a household should in theory experience a 
positive effect of restrictions on other farms in their neighborhood.  
We tested this hypothesis by calculating the average share of land with restrictions among all 
sampled households in a commune and included this variable in regression 3 in the model in Table 
6. This did not change the sign on the variable measuring the household’s own restrictions. 
Furthermore, the commune-average variable entered with the wrong sign (negative), although 
insignificantly different from zero.  
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Second, restrictions tend to come with certain benefits from the authorities, such as increased 
access to extension services, irrigation water or price subsidies (World Bank 1998, p. 13). We 
therefore investigate the importance of such effects. Since some key variables used in these 
analyses (in particular, fertilizer prices and plot level information about the use of high-quality rice 
seed) were only measured in 2006, we rely here on the sample from that year only.  
Consider prices first. The vast majority of households sell their output to private traders, so it is 
implausible that households with restrictions are given subsidies on their output prices. How about 
input prices?  
Table 7 presents results of regression models explaining the unit price paid by each household 
for chemical fertilizers, which is an important, purchased input.12 A number of area-specific 
characteristics, such as remoteness and total demand for fertilizer, may affect prices. Therefore, 
regressions include commune fixed effects. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The first column in Table 7 shows that, controlling for commune characteristics, restrictions are 
indeed associated with a lower unit price of fertilizer. However, once the amount of fertilizer 
purchased is controlled for (in column 2) this effect disappears. It seems that households simply get 
a quantity discount (prices drop by 10 per cent when the purchased amount doubles), and that 
households under restrictions use more fertilizer than others. Hence, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that restricted households are subsidized. 
Table 8 shows the effect of restrictions on access to extension services and irrigation in OLS 
regressions. Again these variables may be strongly affected by community level factors such as 
remoteness and hydrological conditions (in the case of irrigation). Commune fixed effects are 
therefore included. The share of land with restricted crop choice is not positively related to the 
probability of using extension services. In contrast, restricted farms are more likely to have access 
to irrigation. In particular, they are more likely to use public or cooperative irrigation infrastructure. 
This might be the result of either (i) a higher tendency for irrigated plots to be put under restrictions, 
or (ii) a higher willingness on part of authorities to supply irrigation water to restricted plots. Note, 
though, that access to irrigation is already controlled for in the income regressions. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
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Finally, an important determinant of rice yields is the type of seeds used. In particular, the 
introduction of hybrid seeds is a key important factor behind the improvement of rice yields 
experienced in Vietnam over recent decades. Substantial investments and government effort have 
gone into promoting breeding, multiplication and extension of good quality seed of high-yielding 
varieties.  
Table 9 shows the effects of restrictions on the probability that a plot is sown with hybrid seeds 
in at least one season in the last 12 months, using OLS regressions at the plot level with household 
fixed effects. The regressions only include plots sown with rice in at least some seasons. The 
measure of restrictions used is an indicator for the restriction that the plot must be sown with rice in 
at least some seasons. Results show that restricted plots are more likely to be sown with hybrid 
seeds than other plots. This indicates that better seeds are supplied to restricted plots than to other 
plots, either because authorities favor these plots or because restricted plots are more likely to be 
endowed with characteristics necessary for successful use of hybrid seeds, such as irrigation. 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
In sum, the evidence indicates that restricted households do not obtain better prices of fertilizer 
or better access to extension services. However, restricted plots are more likely to be irrigated and 
to be sown with hybrid seeds than other plots. Hence, results are consistent with the view that 
restricted plots are supplied with better inputs than other plots, in line with officially declared 
government policy. 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This paper took as starting point that the global economic crises have re-invigorated the 
international debate about the optimal development strategies and policies to achieve growth, 
structural transformation and poverty reduction. Development thinking and practice is under 
scrutiny and it is becoming increasingly evident that there are many paths to development due to 
differing country contexts and circumstances. It is also becoming evident that locating and 
remaining on a successful development path is difficult, and that policy mistakes are unavoidable. 
The key to success includes the willingness and ability to learn from such mistakes and change 
course in more productive directions. At the same time, it is widely agreed that the way in which 
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property rights and land use arrangements are structured and managed are of the utmost importance 
to economic progress.  
It is, on this background, somewhat surprising that existing studies of land property rights have 
so far ignored the importance and economic implications of the rights to determine how to use the 
land. This motivated the present paper, which is the first analysis of the effects of restrictions on 
crop choice in Vietnam. In fact, in spite of the importance of crop restrictions in a variety of settings 
we are unaware of any analytical up-to-date studies focusing on this issue in transition economies.  
Vietnam is an intriguing case of economic development. Wide-ranging market oriented reforms 
have been coupled with robust economic growth and poverty reduction over the past two decades. 
At the same time, the state has retained a strong and interventionist stance in many aspects of 
economic and social life and organization. Vietnam defies simplistic categorization, but it does 
provide a window of insight into the issues we have identified above.  
From our analysis it emerged that restrictions on crop choice are indeed common and 
widespread and both the quantitative and qualitative evidence indicates that restrictions impose real 
constraints on the behavior of farmers. When restrictions are lifted, farmers in many cases change 
their choice of crop. Restrictions have also had a significant effect on household labor supply, but 
no effect on income from cultivation was found. The evidence presented is therefore consistent with 
the view that restricted households are effectively supplied (compensated) by the authorities with 
higher quality inputs than other households in accordance with officially declared policy. Another 
result, in line with previous literature, is that land titles have significant effects on crop choice and 
household labor supply. 
Our results suggest that land use restrictions should not be ignored in analyses of land policies 
in Vietnam and other transition economies, such as China and countries in Central Asia, where 
restrictions on crop choice are common. In these economies, the tendency in the literature to focus 
on transfer rights instead of use rights should be reconsidered. From a methodological perspective 
we have demonstrated that using panel data at both household and plot level in studies of land 
property rights are associated with significant advantages. 
Turning to policy implications, our study illustrates that there are indeed many paths to 
development as alluded to above. The Vietnamese government has managed to combine market 
reforms with strong and effective intervention in agricultural production for food security and 
export promotion purposes. Thus, we find no basis for recommending dismantling of state 
intervention in the agriculture sector. On the other hand, our results demonstrate that high, 
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mandated rice production comes with significant costs in terms of labor allocation. This does 
suggest that the potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern should be carefully assessed at 
a point in time where global food markets are under pressure. This is highlighted by the fact that as 
Vietnam produces a large surplus of rice and transport infrastructure is becoming increasingly 
developed, concerns about food security ought to become less of a challenge than in the past. 
Restrictions that compel farmers to growing rice tie up significant labor resources in low-value 
added agriculture. As Vietnam continues to develop at a rapid pace, human resources may well be 
put to better use in the production of higher-value added agricultural crops and work in non-farm 
activities. There are important lessons in this evidence for other countries, which may be tempted to 
refrain from engaging in global food markets in light of recent experiences. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 For general surveys of the literature on land rights and other policies related to land, see Feder and Nishio (1999), 
Deininger and Feder (2001), Deininger (2003), and Pande and Udry (2005). 
 
2 We know of only one other study which uses a plot-level panel to study land rights. Goldstein and Udry (2008) 
analyze the relationship between political power, tenure security and investment in seven villages/hamlets in the 
Akwapim region of Ghana. In contrast with their work we include plot fixed effects in our regressions. 
 
3 For in-depth descriptions of land policies in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet (2006) and Marsh et al. (2006). 
 
4 Somewhat ironically for a document that assigns private property rights in a communist country, LUCs are also known 
as “red books”. LUCs grant 20 year tenure security for annual crops land (50 years for perennial crops land) and a wide 
range of transfer rights, but not the right to determine use. The descriptive report by Brandt et al. (2005), based on the 
2004 VHLSS, also contains statistics on the prevalence of LUCs. 
 
5 This is based on extensive information of a qualitative nature (including in-depth discussion with officials at national 
level in CIEM, ILSSA, IPSARD and MONRE, and observations made during repeated field trips by the authors over 
the past seven years). The summary is also consistent with Vasavakul (2006), who writes: “Within the Vietnamese 
physical planning framework, rules and regulations governing rice land seem the most rigid. The central government 
insists on the need to maintain a certain amount of rice growing area for food security purposes, and each province has 
local plans for rice growing. Currently, the adopted plan is to retain a total of about 4.2 million ha of rice land until the 
year 2010. Farmers living in rice growing areas will not be allowed to grow other crops.” (p. 227). Similarly, Marsh and 
Macauley (2006) state: “In some districts control over production in still exerted by the State, particularly with regard to 
rice production (….) Production targets are set at a local level in response to government directives and individual 
households may have to grow crops as directed.” 
 
6 Interestingly, we have found no documentation that communities forced members to grow rice in the pre-Communist 
era, either in the south or in the north, although of course rice was by far the most important crop also then. 
  
7 In the figure, the income schedule under restrictions (PPr) is always strictly below the income schedule without 
restrictions (PP). In general, the two schedules may run on top each other over some ranges of X (those ranges where 
the crop mix is identical with- and without restrictions). Since the household can never, in this simple setting, be strictly 
better off with a restriction than without it, PPr is never above PP. The assumption that the restriction is binding implies 
that the optimal point under the restriction, B, is strictly inside the area delimited by PP and the axes (i.e. that it is on a 
lower indifference curve than the optimal point without restrictions, A). 
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8 See CIEM et al. (2007, 2009) for further background information and details. The sampled provinces are, by region: 
Red River Delta: Ha Tay. North East: Lao Cai, Phu Tho. North West: Lai Chau, Dien Bien. North Central Coast: Nghe 
Anh. South Central Coast: Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa. Central Highlands: Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong. Mekong 
River Delta: Long An. 
 
9 Land titles, and transfer rights in general, are typically regarded as endogenous in the literature (e.g. Besley 1995; 
Braselle et al. 2004; Markussen 2008). However, since a main source of endogeneity is unobserved household and land 
characteristics (such as entrepreneurship and soil quality), it is plausible that land titles are exogenous in the plot fixed 
effects model, where these factors are controlled, in contrast with the cross-section models typically estimated 
(including an earlier draft of this paper based on the 2006 data only). 
 
10 Due to the authoritarian and rather intrusive nature of the Vietnamese state, readers may wonder whether respondents 
are likely to answer truthfully to questions about subjective motivations for household behavior. First, based on 
personal observations from the data collection process, it is our clear impression that respondents generally answer all 
types of questions frankly. In the vast majority of cases, commune personnel did not attend interviews. Second, if the 
purpose of an answer is to please the authorities, it seems that stating “high productivity” as the main reason for crop 
choice would be a better choice than “obliged by commune authorities”. The ideal subject would, presumably, follow 
the commune plan out of conviction, rather than mere obligation.  
 
11 Following the 1993 Land Law, most plots in Vietnam were, as described by Le (undated), classified for tax purposes. 
For annual crops land, six categories were defined. For perennial crops land there were five categories. Classification 
depended on five objective plot characteristics, soil quality, location (i.e. distance from residence), terrain (e.g. slope), 
climate, and irrigation conditions. Higher taxes were due for land in a better category (category one is best). Based on 
the tax-classification information, we created a unified measure of land quality applying to both annual and perennial 
crops land. The classification schemes for annual and perennial land are unified based on the tax rates for each category 
of land. Hence, in each of the four land quality “classes” we define, approximately the same amount of tax was due for 
all plots. The four classes on the land quality variable relate to the tax classification scheme in the following way:  
Class 1: Category 1 of annual land and category 1 and 2 of perennial land. Tax rates: 550-650 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 2: Category 2 and 3 of annual land and category 3 of perennial land. Tax rates: 370-460 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 3: Category 4 and 5 of annual land and category 4 of perennial land. Tax rates: 180-280 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 4: Category 6 of annual land and category 5 of perennial land. Tax rates: 50-80 kg rice/ha/year. 
Since the tax-related land-classifications have not been updated since the 1990s, as a result of the land tax being 
abandoned in 2003, the variable is in our analysis fixed at the plot level from 2006 to 2008. 
 
12 651 households did not report fertilizer prices. 21 households were excluded because they reported prices below 1000 
VND per kg., which was deemed unrealistically low. The results do not change substantially if they are included. 
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Table 1. Land restricted for rice production, regional and 
national level (2006)  
(percent of all land for crop agriculture) 
North East and North West 17.9 
Red river delta 74.9 
North Central Coast 40.0 
South Central Coast 23.4 
Central Highlands 4.9 
South East 9.6 
Mekong river delta 68.3 
  Vietnam 35.3 
Source: data compiled by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MONRE) based on the detailed 2006 National Land Use Plan. 
 
 
Figure 1. The effect of a crop choice restriction on leisure and income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ illustration. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics  
(means, unless otherwise specified) 
 
 
Variable 2006 2008 
Observations 
(total) 
Plot level1   
 Crop choice restricted 0.52 0.45* 16,520 
Must grow rice 0.48 0.41* 16,520 
Has red book (title) 0.74 0.73 16,698 
Planted with rice 0.65 0.62 15,879 
Irrigated 0.68 0.68 16,698 
Rented 0.05 0.05 16,698 
Household level 
   
Household size 4.7 4.6 4,029 
Age of household head 50.1 51.5* 4,028 
Female household head 0.19 0.20* 4,029 
Years of schooling, hh 
head 
5.8 6.2* 4,028 
Income from crop 
agriculture, '000 VND 
(2006 RRD prices, 
median)2 
3,900 5,819* 3,894 
Operated ag. area, sqm. 
(median)  
3,500 3,309 4,030 
Labor supply per working 
hh member, days in last 
12 months 
175 177 4,009 
Labor input in crop 
agriculture per working 
hh member, days in last 
12 months 
57 61* 4,009 
Real farm gate rice price 
('000 VND/kg)3 
2.6 3.9* 466 
1Only plots where crops are grown are included. 
2 Income and prices are adjusted for regional differences in price levels, and for region specific 
inflation. The base is prices in rural areas of the Red River Delta in 2006 (the 2006 baseline is 
calculated from VHLSS 2006, and region-specific inflation from July 2006 to July 2008 is 
calculated on the basis of data provided by the General Statistics Office (GSO). The income- and 
farm size variables are quite strongly skewed to the right, so medians are more informative than 
means.  
3 Rice- and maize prices are calculated as the average price received by the sampled households 
in a commune. The number of observations refers to the number of communes. For communes 
where a crop was not traded, the district average is used. 
* Denotes that the difference between 2006 and 2008 is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3. Crop choice regressions with plot FE, 2006-08 
  Dep. Variable: Plot planted with rice 
Must grow rice 0.144 0.124 0.385 
 
(8.08)*** (7.22)*** (15.33)*** 
Red book 
 
0.041 0.039 
  
(2.33)** (2.20)** 
Irrigated 
 
0.212 0.357 
  
(10.88)*** (14.89)*** 
Real farm gate rice price, log 0.034 -0.033 
  
(0.72) (0.45) 
Years of schooling, hh head -0.001 -0.006 
  
(0.36) (2.94)*** 
Year = 2008 
 
0.002 0.033 
  
(0.09) (1.06) 
Constant 0.569 0.365 0.258 
 
(71.29)*** (8.00)*** (3.59)*** 
Fixed effects Plot Plot None 
    R-sq, within 0.05 0.12 
 R-sq, between 0.41 0.45 
 R-sq, overall 0.30 0.38 0.40 
    No. Plots 7,325 7,325 7,325 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the commune level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Stated reasons for crop choice, 2008 (%) 
 
Reason All plots 
Plots with restricted crop 
choice 
Obliged by commune authorities 37.3 80.4 
High productivity/high efficiency 40.5 12.0 
Plot not suitable for other crops 16.7 6.5 
Other 5.5 1.2 
N=7,672 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 5. Restrictions and labor supply, household fixed effects 
    Dependent variable: 
  
Hh labor supply in crop agriculture 
per working household member, log 
Total hh labor supply per working 
household member, log 
Share of land with restrictions 0.098 0.115 0.139 0.100 0.106 0.095 
 
(1.55) (1.85)* (2.82)*** (2.68)*** (2.77)*** (2.91)*** 
Share of land with red book 
 
-0.071 -0.09 
 
0.102 0.079 
  
(0.96) (1.74)* 
 
(2.32)** (2.19)** 
Farmsize in sqm, log 
 
0.249 0.411 
 
0.074 0.033 
  
(5.54)*** (17.69)*** 
 
(2.58)** (2.47)** 
HH size, log 
 
-0.513 -0.315 
 
0.004 0.103 
  
(5.97)*** (8.08)*** 
 
(0.07) (2.97)*** 
Real farm gate rice price, log 
 
0.08 0.717 
 
0.056 -0.065 
  
(0.40) (4.29)*** 
 
(0.48) (0.59) 
Years of schooling, hh head 
 
-0.001 0.003 
 
-0.001 0.031 
  
(0.12) -0.65 
 
(0.21) (10.51)*** 
year_2008 0.068 0.035 -0.207 -0.008 -0.024 0.002 
 
(1.97)** (0.40) (2.63)*** (0.43) (0.49) -0.05 
Constant 3.707 2.374 0.107 5.01 4.272 4.412 
 
(110.77)*** (5.46)*** (0.41) (287.22)*** (14.44)*** (23.89)*** 
Fixed effects Household Household None Household Household None 
       R-sq, within 0.01 0.05 
 
0.01 0.01 
 R-sq, between 0.01 0.24 
 
0.01 0.01 
 R-sq, overall 0.005 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.06 
       Observations 3,907 3,906 3,906 4,004 4,004 4,003 
Number of household 2,103 2,103 2,103 2,138 2,138 2,138 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the commune level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 6. Restrictions and income, household fixed effects 
    Dependent var: Income from crop production, log 
Share of land with restrictions 0.018 0.044 0.054 0.027 
 
(0.31) (0.76) (0.94) (0.61) 
Share of land with red book 
 
0.102 0.108 0.099 
  
(1.45) (1.54) (2.31)** 
Farmsize in sqm, log 
 
0.478 0.472 0.609 
  
(6.81)*** (6.87)*** (25.76)*** 
Household labor input in crop production, log 0.175 0.175 0.36 
  
(5.61)*** (5.76)*** (13.81)*** 
Share of land irrigated 
 
0.045 0.036 0.406 
  
(0.61) (0.50) (7.21)*** 
Share of land rented in 
 
0.108 0.123 0.255 
  
(0.75) (0.87) (3.13)*** 
Real farm gate rice price, log 
 
0.546 0.573 0.71 
  
(3.53)*** (3.72)*** (4.85)*** 
Years of schooling, hh head 
 
0.014 0.012 0.013 
  
(1.78)* (1.47) (3.13)*** 
Year = 2008 0.348 0.129 0.095 0.036 
 
(12.09)*** (1.97)** (1.42) (0.57) 
Share of land with slight slope 
  
-0.061 -0.077 
   
(1.08) (1.58) 
Share of land with medium slope 
  
0.004 -0.134 
   
(0.05) (1.90)* 
Share of land with steep slope 
  
-0.031 -0.199 
   
(0.16) (1.44) 
Share of land class 2 
  
-0.004 -0.042 
   
(0.06) (0.80) 
Share of land class 3 
  
-0.12 -0.297 
   
(1.45) (4.44)*** 
Share of land class 4 
  
-0.054 -0.263 
   
(0.38) (1.88)* 
Share of land with unknown category/class 
 
0.09 -0.073 
   
(1.43) (1.26) 
Age of head 
  
-0.001 -0.002 
   
(0.24) (2.37)** 
Female hh head 
  
0.027 -0.054 
   
(0.21) (1.46) 
     Constant 8.289 2.813 2.834 0.645 
 
(293.84)*** (4.88)*** (4.92)*** (2.68)*** 
Fixed effects Household Household Household None 
     R-sq, within 0.13 0.26 0.26 
 R-sq, between 0.003 0.65 0.65 
 R-sq, overall 0.02 0.58 0.58 0.61 
     Observations 3768 3768 3765 3765 
Number of household 2049 2049 2049 2049 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for clustering at the commune level. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 7. Restrictions and the price of chemical fertilizers  
 OLS OLS 
Share of land with restrictions -0.042 0.004 
 (1.52) (0.16) 
Amount of fertilizer purchased, log  -0.104 
  (11.28)*** 
Constant 1.275 1.83 
 (82.35)*** (35.67)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune 
   
Observations 1,647 1,647 
R-squared 0.55 0.59 
Note: the dependent variable is the unit price of chemical fertilizers, log. Observations with reported prices of fertilizer less than 1,000 VND pr kg are 
deemed unrealistic and were set as missing. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 8. Restriction and use extension services and irrigation 
 Dependent variable 
 
Hh used extension 
services in last 12 
months=1 
Share of land 
irrigated 
Hh dependent on 
public or 
cooperative 
irrigation=1 
Share of land with restrictions -0.03 0.171 0.187 
 (0.86) (8.46)*** (8.12)*** 
Constant 0.425 0.59 0.552 
 (23.05)*** (55.37)*** (45.63)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune Commune 
    
Observations 2081 2081 2081 
R-squared 0.38 0.65 0.72 
Note: All models are estimated with OLS.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 9. Restrictions, hybrid seeds and the number of cropping seasons 
Must grow rice in at least some seasons 0.077 0.076 
 (5.15)*** (5.18)*** 
Number of rice harvests in last 12 months  0.085 
  (9.15)*** 
Constant 0.297 0.144 
 (45.58)*** (8.07)*** 
Fixed effects Household Household 
   
Observations 6,205 6,205 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household used hybrid seeds in at least one season in the last 
12 months All models are estimated with OLS. Only plots planted with rice in at least some seasons are 
included. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
